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The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent medicine for the person [1] is related to Medical Ethics.
Medicine for the person conceptually represents an attempt to bring to the foreground attention to the person (basi-
cally the person of the patient but also that of the physician) as opposed to the inattention, disrespect and disregard 
of the person, an attitude that prevails in modern Medicine [2–5] (but also in modern Society as such). This is a 
consequence of a variety of factors but, as refers to Medicine, fragmentation of care and hyperbolic dependence on 
technology seem to be major contributors [1].
It would certainly be naïve to deny the importance of specialization (a prerequisite to achieving expertise in a 
specific field of scientific knowledge) and disregarding the advantages of technological achievements with their 
immense contribution to Medicine. Yet, as Hippocrates has stressed many centuries ago, it is important to avoid 
excesses (‘παv μέтρоv άρıσтоv’—nothing in excess). In certain cases, overspecialization has deprived the phy-
sician of his (her) holistic vista and excessive and disproportionate dependence on technology has reduced the 
patient to a ‘case’ and the physician to a mere technician of health and not a person ‘equal to God’ (‘ıσόθεоς’) (as 
professed by Hippocrates).
These developments certainly have ethical implications that should be carefully considered, especially with refer-
ence to the quality of care that we provide to our patients.
One of the components of good quality of care is satisfaction of not only the biological but also the psychosocial 
needs of the patient. The importance for this holistic approach has again been strongly advocated by Ancient Greek 
philosophers and physicians like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle [6] but also by Ayurvedic and Chinese medical tradi-
tions [1].
Good quality of care is also promoted by attention to concepts and, more importantly, practices like positive mental 
health (that keeps people healthy, in contrast to ones that cure an illness after its appearance) as well as empower-
ment, resilience, recovery [7, 8] and values-based medicine [9] that promote the active involvement of the person 
in maintaining health, protecting him (her) self from illness and recovering from it. Clearly, this is consistent with 
the ethical principle of autonomy as put forward by Beauchamp and Childress [10] in their Principlism theory of 
Ethics.
The existing Moral theories in Medicine, as summarized by Green and Bloch are Virtue Ethics, Casuistry, Deonto-
logical Theory, Utilitarianism, Principlism and Ethics of Care [11]. The importance of each of these theoretical frame-
works depends on the criteria for their evaluation but it is generally believed that Virtue Ethics is “the only approach 
that has retained relevance over the course of history” [12]. This is because ethical principles are filtered through 
the individual practitioner and it is up to the practitioner and his virtuous or non-virtuous personality to implement or 
undermine the ethical concept behind each moral theory. Implementation is personified and individualized and the 
ethical message can be enhanced, highlighted, differentiated distorted or even neutralized and abandoned alto-
gether. This is why the personified approach should concern not only the patient but the physician as well. Clearly, 
there is need not only for Medicine for the person but also Medicine by the person.
In conclusion, Ethics is a sine qua non component of medicine and psychiatry for the person. This is particularly true 
of Clinical Medicine and Clinical Psychiatry where there is (or more accurately, should be) active interpersonal inter-
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effects of this interaction, have the obligation to provide convincing evidence towards this direction and persuade 
our hesitant colleagues that being ‘nice’ to the patient does not serve only the needs of civilized social behavior, 
does not serve only a philanthropic purpose but, more than that, has a substantial therapeutic effect. Spending a 
little time with the patient to facilitate compliance to medication can have tremendous beneficial advantages for 
the patient and can be very rewarding for the physician as well. Is it ethical to ignore the therapeutic potential of 
the doctor-patient interpersonal relationship? Is it ethical to deprive the patient of the advantages of a therapeutic 
intervention because we do not (want to) have time to discuss compliance to this intervention with the patient? Is it 
ethical to practice defensive medicine and disregard our Hippocratic obligation to consider the patient’s well-being 
as our first priority? And how about the relationship of the physician with the rest of the staff? Is it ethical to allow 
interpersonal disputes and dysfunctions arising from a non-personified (and often ignoring, depreciating and humili-
ating) attitude to interfere with the treatment of our patients? There are questions that should be in the focus of our 
attention, if we want to bring our theoretical “Ethics of person-centered Medicine” ideas into practice.
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